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Abstract 
In many cognitive tasks where humans are thought to rely on executive functioning, 
pigeons’ behavior can be explained by associative processes.  A key form of executive 
functioning is inhibiting prepotent responses, often investigated in humans by means of 
“Stop-signal” or “Change-signal” procedures.  In these procedures, execution of a well-
practised (“Go”) response to a stimulus is occasionally interrupted by a signal to withhold or 
alter the practised response.  Performance in such tasks is usually described by the 
“independent horse horse-race model” model.  This model assumes that the processes that 
cause the Go and inhibitory responses occur independently; the process that finishes first 
determines the response observed.  We further tested this model by training pigeons to 
track the circular movement of a colored patch around a touchscreen by pecking it; the spot 
occasionally deviated from its normal path (the Change signal). The pigeons had to inhibit 
the habitual movement of their heads in order to land a peck on the spot in its unexpected 
position.  The key predictions of the independent horse-race model were confirmed in the 
pigeons’ latency data. Thus, the independent race model can also successfully describe 
Stop-change performance of subjects that do not rely on executive control. 
Keywords: Executive control; stop-signal procedure; response latency; independent horse-
race model; pigeons 
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Introduction 
The processes underlying the inhibition of prepotent responses have been the subject of much 
recent research across disciplines (Verbruggen et al., 2019).  In human cognition, response inhibition 
is seen as a core feature of executive control (Shallice & Burgess, 1993; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008b), 
and its taxonomic distribution has therefore been studied extensively (MacLean et al., 2014), with 
the object of understanding whether executive control can be attributed to any non-human species, 
and if so, which.  However, response inhibition need not involve executive processes; indeed, 
inhibition has been a core element in theories of associative learning from Pavlov (1927) onwards.  
Evidence is beginning to accumulate suggesting that tasks commonly used to assess response 
inhibition can be understood in associative terms. For example, Meier, Lea and McLaren (2018) have 
recently demonstrated that pigeons can be trained in tasks modelled on the Stop Signal and Change 
Signal tasks commonly used to examine response inhibition in human cognition, and that their 
behavior in these tasks can be predicted by the independent horse-race model of Logan & Cowan 
(1984; see also Verbruggen & Logan, 2008b, 2009). The present paper is a further exploration of 
pigeons’ performance in Change-Signal tasks. 
In the Stop or Change-Signal task, the participant repeatedly has to make a well-practised 
response to a signal (the Go Stimulus), but occasionally this signal is either replaced, or almost 
immediately followed, by a different signal which requires the participant to withhold the normal 
response (in the case of a Stop Signal) or switch to a different one (in the case of a Change Signal).  
These test trials are referred to as Stop or Change trials.  For example, in a Stop-Signal task, human 
participants might be instructed that a green dot will repeatedly be presented on screen, and that 
they should mouse-click on this green dot as soon as it appears. However, on some trials, the green 
dot might change to a red color shortly after the start of the trial. If this happens, the participants 
should withhold any response and instead wait for the trial to end. In a Change-Signal task, 
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participants might be instructed, when seeing the red dot, not to mouse-click on that dot but instead 
to move the mouse and click on a different target.   
Logan and Cowan’s (1984) independent horse-race model is a special case of a very general class 
of models of choice reaction times, in which different stimuli are thought to initiate independent 
mental or neural processes, with the outcome of the choice depending on which of those processes 
terminates first (see also Logan, Van Zandt, Verbruggen, & Wagenmakers, 2014).  Other examples 
include the stochastic model of Audley (1960) and the Sequential Choice Model of Shapiro, Siller and 
Kacelnik (2008) – indeed, the latter authors also use the horse race metaphor.  These models have 
been applied to a wide range of experimental situations, for example mid-session reversal in pigeons 
(Smith, Zentall & Kacelnik, 2018). The horse-race model specifically postulates that initiating a 
response and withholding a response are two independent processes: an excitatory go process that 
is triggered by the presentation of a stimulus demanding the response, and an inhibitory stop 
process triggered by a signal not to respond. Performance depends on the outcome of the "race" 
between these two processes: If the stop process finishes before the go process, the response is 
correctly withheld (signal-inhibit); but if the go processes finishes first, the response is incorrectly 
executed (signal-respond).  Go and stop are assumed to be independent.  Verbruggen and Logan 
(2009) reviewed the literature and concluded that the independence assumptions are met in most 
Stop-signal and Change-signal studies, although neural data suggest that there is a brief moment of 
interaction towards the end (to suppress the actual motor output; see e.g. Boucher, Palmeri, Logan, 
& Schall, 2007). Interestingly, the horse-race model makes no assumptions about the involvement of 
executive control in response inhibition - and in fact, it has been proposed that response inhibition 
in Stop-Signal and Change-Signal paradigms may be mediated (at least in part) by associative 
processes even in humans.  In several studies, Verbruggen and colleagues (Verbruggen & Logan, 
2008a, 2009a; Verbruggen, Best, Bowditch, Stevens, & McLaren, 2014; Best, Lawrence, Logan, 
McLaren, & Verbruggen, 2015) have presented evidence that a stimulus that was consistently paired 
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with the command to withhold a response eventually elicited automatic response inhibition. They 
argued that this effect could occur through associative learning.  
In human cognition, executive functions are seen as crucial for the planning of actions, which 
demands the ability to anticipate and select appropriate responses. However, Meier et al. (2018), 
using pigeons, replicated at least some aspects of human performance on Stop- and Change-signal 
tasks.  Pigeons have repeatedly demonstrated responding purely on the basis of stimulus-response 
associations under conditions in which humans employ more reflective processes (e.g. Lea, Wills, 
Leaver et al., 2009; Meier, Lea, & McLaren, 2016a, 2016b; Wasserman, Nagasaka, Castro et al., 2013; 
Wills, Lea, Leaver et al., 2009). Meier et al.’s results therefore support the claim that associative 
processes are sufficient to produce typical human behavior in such tasks, and the use of those tasks 
to assess executive control may therefore need re-appraisal.  .   
The Stop-signal and Change-signal tasks have found substantial use in experiments on rats (e.g. 
Feola, de Wit & Richards, 2000), and also on rhesus monkeys, using as responses both saccades (e.g. 
Hanes, Patterson & Schall, 1998) and arm movements (e.g. Scangos & Stuphorn 2010).  In most of 
these studies, however, the focus has been on the neural or biochemical basis of the inhibitory 
responses.  In addition to the experiment of Meier et al. (2018) cited above, three further 
experiments have taken a more purely behavioral approach to investigating the fit of the horse-race 
model to Stop- or Change-signal tasks in a variety of non-human species, all producing results that 
tend to support the model.  Beuk, Beninger and Paré (2014) used rats, Knolle, McBride, Stewart et 
al. (2017) used sheep, and Meier, Pant, Van Horik et al. (2017) used pheasants.  The tasks used in 
these experiments varied.   Humans participating in Stop- or Change-Signal tasks are typically 
required to click a mouse or key in response to signals appearing on a small screen, and hence Beck 
et al. (2014) required their rats to press levers near signal lights, while Meier et al. (2018) required 
their pigeons to peck at similar stimuli on a touchscreen.    However, Meier et al. (2017) and Knolle 
et al. (2017) deployed tasks that were quite different from those used in the human cognition 
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literature: they required animals to alter the course of locomotion, thus making a change response 
with their entire bodies.  Unlike the experiments of Beck et al. (2014) and Meier et al. (2018), these 
experiments did not require extensive training to establish the prepotent “Go” response, but took 
advantage of the animals’ unconditional response of approaching food.   
The present experiment was designed to bridge between these two types of procedure.  It 
involved pigeons pecking at a touchscreen, but the stimuli were arranged so that the pigeon was in 
the course of an extended movement, tracking a target that moved in a regular fashion across a 
screen.  Like the experiments of Knolle et al. (2017) and Meier et al. (2017), therefore, it created a 
situation in which there might be an expectation of continuity of action, which would be violated by 
a Change signal.  By testing the predictions of the independent horse-race model in this novel 
situation, which links the two rather different experimental approaches that have been used so far, 
the experiment aimed to strengthen (or, of course, challenge) the claim that Stop- and Change-
Signal tasks in general can be understood in terms of associative processes. 
The simplest prediction of the independent horse-race model is that error responses made on 
Stop or Change trials will have a shorter mean latency than correct responses on Go trials (Logan & 
Cowan, 1984).  This is because errors represent the case where the inhibitory process loses the 
horse race: the distribution of their latencies should therefore be the same as the distribution of 
responses on Go trials (when only the excitatory process is operative), curtailed by the distribution 
of latencies of the Stop or Change response.  This prediction does not require any assumptions 
about the form or parameters of the latency distributions.  Put simply, only a faster subset of the Go 
responses will ‘win’ the horse race on signal trials.  For a simple test of the independent horse-race 
model, responses on a probe trial that were so fast that they prevent the occurrence of the stimulus 
change (referred to below as Prevention responses) should be included in the Error distribution, and 
this is what is commonly done in the human experimental literature (see Verbruggen et al., 2019).  
In the present experiment, however, they were excluded, in order to allow a comparison of 
 8 
predictions with alternative models; since these are the fastest responses, excluding them 
conservative when testing the hypothesis that Error latencies will be relatively short. 
An additional prediction of the horse-race model concerns the effect of postponing the 
presentation of the Stop or Change signal for a brief period (termed the Stop Signal Delay, SSD).  It is 
obvious that, the longer the SSD, the more errors the subject will make on Stop or Change trials, 
because the inhibitory process is being handicapped in the horse race: it cannot start until the Stop 
or Change signal appears.  Although this prediction is routinely confirmed in the human literature, as 
we noted above, standard practice in such experiments is to include trials where the subject 
responds to the “Go” stimulus before the Stop or Change stimulus appears as errors. For reasons 
explained above, we did not do that, and we therefore cannot be sure that this prediction applies in 
our analysis.  A further quantitative prediction about Stop-Signal Delays can be made, however. 
Logan and Burkell (1986) found that, in a Stop-change task with humans, the latency from the 
moment of presentation of the change signal to the moment of successful execution of a change 
response was affected very little by the SSD.  That is to be expected since the correct, change 
response is triggered by the stimulus change, so its latency timed from that moment should be the 
same regardless of SSD.   
It might seem that it is a foregone conclusion that Error responses on Stop or Change trials should 
be faster, on average, than correct Go responses.  It is not.  It is possible that the presentation of a 
Stop or Change stimulus would cause either animal subjects, or human participants, to cancel any 
ongoing response emission process, and re-evaluate the situation as a decision between two 
options.  Thus we can contrast the predictions of the independent horse-race model with those of 
models of choice reaction time, in which choice is considered as a distinct cognitive process.  Such a 
process must involve some kind of weighing up and comparing two or more options.  As Smith et al. 
(2018) point out, it is ordinarily assumed that choice in this sense incurs some kind of cognitive cost, 
which will be reflected in slower reaction times when a choice has to be made.  This is seen in the 
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Hick-Hyman law for choice reaction time (Hick, 1952; Hyman, 1953), which though developed to 
describe human behavior also fits data from pigeons (e.g. Vickrey & Neuringer, 2000).  So if a 
comparative decision process underlies responding in Stop or Change stimulus procedures, we 
should expect slower responding on probe trials, since on those trials a choice has to be made.  The 
independent race model, in contrast, involves no such comparative process, and as a result it 
predicts faster responding to the Stop or Change stimulus on probe trials than on non-probe trials 
(when no choice is required; i.e. the pigeon simply has to peck the original location).  However, a 
model involving comparison between stimuli cannot make any prediction for responses that are 
complete before the stimulus change occurs (i.e. before the expiry of the SSD).  In order to allow a 
comparison between a choice-reaction model and the independent horse-race model, we excluded 
such “Prevention” responses from the distribution of Error response latencies. 
In the present experiment, pigeons were presented with a colored target (the Go stimulus) that 
moved in a regular arc around a touchscreen when the pigeon pecked at it.  This kind of tracking task 
is known to be within the pigeon’s capacity, and the birds show by anticipatory responses that they 
have learned that movement of the target is regular (Wilkinson & Kirkpatrick, 2009).  In our version 
of the task, on probe trials, the target changed color after a brief delay (the SSD); simultaneously, an 
additional target, in the normal Go color, appeared slightly towards the center of the screen from 
the normal trajectory.  The pigeon’s task was to peck the Go-colored target, wherever it appeared, 
causing it to move onwards.  Pecking the Changed-color target counted as an error, and did not 
advance the target.  If, on a probe trial, the pigeon pecked the Go-colored target before the SSD had 
been completed and the target had changed color, the scheduled change of position was cancelled.  
In our situation, the predictions of the horse race model for latencies in probe trials are therefore: 
(1) The probability of incorrectly pecking the Changed-color stimulus will increase as the SSD 
increases.  This prediction arises because, the longer the SSD, the more advanced the process of 
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responding to the stimulus in its unchanged position will be, and therefore the lower the probability 
that the response to the stimulus in its Changed position can beat it in the horse race. 
(2) Timed from the start of the probe trial, the mean latency to peck the Changed-color stimulus 
(referred to below as the Error latency) will be shorter than the mean latency to peck the Go 
stimulus on its normal trajectory (referred to below as the Go latency).  This is the key prediction, 
and as explained above, it arises because, under the independent horse-race model, slow Error 
responses are less likely to occur because they are pre-empted by successful Change responses.   
(3) Timed from the moment when the target stimulus changed color (and the additional target 
appeared in its new position), the latency to correctly peck the target in its new position will be 
independent of SSD.  We refer to this latency as the Change-Correct latency.  It follows that timed 
from the start of the probe trial, the latency of a correct peck should increase with SSD.  We refer to 
this latency below as the Start-Correct latency. 
Note that it is not possible to make a prediction based on Logan and Burkell’s (1986) observation 
that pecks to the target in its changed position will have shorter latencies for longer SSDs on probes 
where the subject responds erroneously.  This is because error and correct responses on probe trials 
were not physically independent (both required the pigeon to peck), whereas in Logan and Burkell’s 
experiment they were made with different hands. 
Method 
Subjects 
Eight pigeons (domestic Columba livia) started the experiment.  They were obtained as discards 
from local fanciers.  They were maintained in an indoor aviary and transferred to cages shortly 
before testing.  Their weights were controlled at or above 80% of their aviary free feeding weights by 
restricted post-test feeding, which was also done in individual cages.  The pigeons are referred to 
here by their names, Almond, Apple, Boo, Congo, Egypt, Kar, Luna, and Pidge.  Because of logistical 
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constraints (the retirement of the first author and consequent repurposing of the laboratory), three 
of the pigeons (Egypt, Kar and Luna) did not complete all the blocks of sessions described below. 
Four of the pigeons (Almond, Apple, Boo and Luna) had previously served as subjects in the Stop- 
and Change-signal experiments of Meier et al. (2018), or in pilot work for those studies using similar 
procedures; the other four had served in unrelated experiments (Lea, Poser-Richet & Meier, 2015, 
and experiments using the same general design; Meier et al., 2016a, 2016b).   
Apparatus 
The experiment was conducted in four 71 x 50.5 x 43.5 cm operant chambers; each pigeon was 
always tested in the same chamber.  One long wall of each chamber was fitted with a 31 x 23.5 cm 
(15-in.) touch monitor (Model  1547L 1024 x 768 pixel TFT monitor with CarrollTouch infra-red 
detector; ELO Touchsystems Inc.), mounted 12 cm above the grid floor of the chamber.  One 
centimeter on the touchscreen corresponded to approximately 30 pixels.  Effective pecks to target 
areas were followed by an immediate bleep from a 50-ohm loudspeaker, which also played white 
noise into the box.  Two 2.8-W white houselights were mounted above and to either side of the 
screen. Two 6 x 5-cm apertures gave access to grain hoppers when solenoids were activated; they 
were located directly below the houselights and 4 cm above the floor of the chamber. The hoppers 
were illuminated by a 2.8-W white light when activated, and contained a 2:1 mixture of hemp seed 
and conditioner.  The interior of some of the boxes was monitored by a video camera. The 
experiment was controlled by a computer (Quadvision Ltd) located in an adjacent laboratory area, 
using the Whisker control server system (Cardinal and Aitken, 2010) with client programs written in 
Microsoft® Visual Basic 6.0.   
Procedure 
All pigeons had previous experience in the chambers used.  They were re-acclimatized to pecking 
the touch screen by a pretraining procedure in which a white filled circle of 80 pixels diameter (the 
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“observing key”) appeared centrally on the touch screen; two pecks at it led to the presentation of a 
random array of white filled hexagons of the same diameter.  Two successive pecks at any hexagon 
caused it to disappear, and a white filled circle to appear close to the nearer feeder.  A single peck at 
this circle led to the feeder being operated for 2.5 seconds.  When all hexagons had been removed, 
there was a variable inter-trial interval of 1 to 5 seconds, followed by the reappearance of the 
observing key.  Pretraining sessions involved eight such arrays.  All pigeons but one required only a 
single pretraining session to ensure that they were removing all the hexagons reliably; the remaining 
pigeon required three sessions.   
Training sessions on the tracking procedure then followed.  They were divided into 36 trials, 
separated by a variable inter-trial interval of 2 to 4 seconds.  Each trial began with the presentation 
of an observing key, a white filled circle of diameter 80 pixels, centered 540 pixels from the top of 
the touchscreen.  A single peck at the observing key led to the presentation of the Go stimulus.  This 
was a filled circle, colored green for four of the pigeons and red for the other four.  In the course of a 
trial, it occupied six successive positions, centered on a semi-circle of radius 200 pixels, itself 
centered at the position of the observing key. On all odd-numbered trials, the Go stimulus was 
initially centered at the 4 o’clock position of this circle.  Two pecks at the stimulus caused it to move 
to the 5 o’clock position, and so on until it reached the 9 o’clock position; two pecks at it then led to 
the immediate operation of the left-hand feeder for 2.5 seconds.  On even-numbered trials, the Go 
stimulus started at the 10 o’clock position and moved clockwise in the same way until it reached the 
3 o’clock position, when two pecks at it led to the immediate presentation of the right-hand feeder 
for 2.5 seconds.  We required two pecks at each location to avoid any risk of a bird “smearing” its 
beak around the semicircle rather than making distinct pecks. 
The median latency of the first peck made to the Go stimulus when it had moved to a new 
position (other than its first position, which required a different kind of movement from the others) 
was defined as the Go latency, and this was used in determining Stop-signal delay (SSD) values for 
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individual pigeons.  Training on the tracking procedure was continued for each pigeon until it was 
reliably completing at least 30 trials per session, and median latency to do so was showing no 
downward trend.  Across pigeons, this required from 23 to 64 sessions; details for each pigeon are 
given in Table 1. 
Figure 1 about here 
Table 1 about here 
Once tracking performance was stable, probe sessions were introduced.  They consisted of 41 
trials.  The first 5 were always training trials, using the same procedure as above.  Included among 
the remaining 36 trials were 12 trials, randomly chosen, within which a probe occurred.  Consistent 
with Stop-signal and Change-signal literature, probe trials occurred infrequently, so that responding 
to the Go stimuli remained prepotent; note that even on probe trials, no change occurred at five out 
of the six target positions, so the overall frequency of probes was one in 20.5 target movements.  
Figure 1 shows the sequence of events on probe trials.  When the Go stimulus had moved to one of 
its positions on the trajectory (excluding the first and the last position), it subsequently moved in 
towards the center of the trajectory by 90 pixels, and was replaced in its normal position by a 
stimulus of the same size but a different color (red for pigeons whose tracking stimulus was green, 
and vice versa).  Pecks at this stimulus (the Changed-color stimulus) counted as errors; they were 
recorded but had no scheduled consequences.  In order to continue tracking and gain reward, the 
pigeon had to peck the Go stimulus in its changed position.  The eight possible positions at which a 
probe could occur were used at random.  The movement occurred after one of three SSDs, which (as 
in the experiment of Meier et al., 2018) were in the ratio 1:2:3 and are referred to below as Short, 
Medium or Long SSD.  On a probe trial, if the pigeon pecked the Go stimulus before the end of the 
SSD, the scheduled change in position was cancelled.  The actual SSD values varied between pigeons 
and sessions, as follows.  There were four blocks of twenty sessions, within which odd sessions used 
training conditions in order to maintain stable performance on the basic task, and even sessions 
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included probe trials; thus there were ten probe sessions per block.  In Blocks 1 and 2, the SSD 
values were 33%, 67% and 100% of the median Go latency from the first training session of Block 1.  
In Block 3, they were 25%, 50% and 75% of this value.  In Block 4, they were 25%, 50% and 75% of 
the median Go latency from the training session immediately preceding the probe session 
concerned.  All pigeons completed Blocks 1 and 2; six pigeons completed Block 3, and five pigeons 
completed Block 4.  Table 1 includes more detail of the SSD values used.  
The experimental sessions took place between May and September 2016. 
Statistical analysis 
Three proportions were calculated across each probe session, and their values were used for 
analysis.  They were: 
Total Error Rate: The proportion of probe trials on which the pigeons pecked the target 
stimulus after it had changed color, relative to the total number of probe trials  
Actual Error Rate:  The proportions of probe trials on which the pigeons pecked the 
target stimulus after it had changed color, relative to the number of probe trials in which the 
color change was not prevented by a peck at the target during the SSD 
Prevention Rate: The proportion of probe trials in which the color change was prevented 
by a peck at the target during the SSD, relative to the total number of probe trials. 
Latencies of all pecking responses were recorded, and their mean values within each probe 
session obtained.  The values used for analysis were:  
Go latencies on non-probe targets in the eight positions where probes could occur;  
Error latencies on probe trials (i.e. latencies from the start of a probe trial to a peck at the 
Changed-color stimulus);  
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Start-Correct latencies (i.e. latencies from the start of a probe trial to a peck at the target 
in its changed position, without pecking the Changed-color stimulus first);  
Change-Correct latencies (i.e. latencies from the moment when a target changed position 
to a correct peck on it, without pecking the Changed-color stimulus first).   
Detailed analysis focused on the data from Block 4 since by that stage visual inspection suggested 
that performance was asymptotic.  Only the data from the five pigeons that completed Block 4 were 
included in statistical analyses.  The maximum number of the critical latencies available for analysis 
was in principle 120 (12 probe trials from each of 10 sessions) though this number was reduced by 
any tendency to make prevention responses (which averaged a third of all probes at the highest SSD 
value), and was then divided between the Change Correct and Error categories.  The number of Go 
latencies available was much higher, coming from all the non-probe trials as well as non-probe 
locations on probe trials.  The statistical significance of the results from Block 4 was assessed by 
Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) analyses (Harding & Hilbe, 2013). In all the analyses, 
dependent variable values were entered as session means.  The distributions of response 
proportions showed pronounced density at zero with a positively skewed distribution of non-zero 
levels, and the analysis therefore used the Tweedie distribution with a log link function.  The 
distributions of latencies were positively skewed and the gamma distribution with a log link function 
was therefore used.  SSD level (Short, Medium and Long) and session number were used as within-
subject variables; session number was treated as a continuous variable so as to test for trends.  The 
Total Error Rates, Actual Error Rates, and Prevention Rates were submitted to GEE analysis using as 
factors the SSD level (Short, Medium or Long) and the session number.  The Go and Error latencies 
were submitted to GEE analysis using as factors the latency type (Go or Error, a within-subjects 
variable), the SSD level and the session number.  The Start-Correct and Change-Correct latencies 
were submitted to separate GEE analyses using the SSD level and session number as factors.  
Significance tests were performed using the confidence limits of the parameters of the fitted GEE 
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model, rather than the overall Model Table, for greater statistical conservatism; where more than 
one parameter was estimated for a factor, chi-squared values for all parameters’ differences from 
the reference value were added to give an overall significance level for the factor.  There does not 
seem to be a currently accepted measure of effect size deriving from the output of GEE analyses, so 
proportions of the variance (POV) of the untransformed data accounted for by different factors and 
interactions were calculated from first principles following guidance in Grissom and Kim (2012) and 
Nakagawa and Schielzeth (2013). Overall model fit is reported in terms of the Quasi Likelihood under 
Independence model Criterion (QIC), in smaller-is-better form.  Statistical analyses were carried out 
using IBM SPSS, versions 22-24.  Full raw data are available at 
https://osf.io/9vmq3/?view_only=bffb02340d064903a92045f2838466f5 
 
Results 
As stated above, all data reported are for the five pigeons that completed all four session blocks.  
Results from the remaining three pigeons were qualitatively similar for the blocks that they 
completed.  Data for non-probe conditions are reported from the test sessions only; results from the 
training sessions interspersed between test sessions were similar. 
Descriptive statistics for data across all four session blocks 
Across all four session blocks, Actual Error Rate (the mean probability of error on probe trials, 
given that the Change signal had appeared), was 0.18, ranging from 0.13 to 0.27 across pigeons.  
Actual Error Rate decreased across session blocks, from a mean of 0.21 (range 0.11 to 0.32) in Block 
1 to a mean of 0.16 (range 0.06 to 0.24) in Block 4.  Contrary to prediction, the pigeons showed no 
monotonic trend in error rates across SSD values (means of 0.16, 0.22 and 0.17 for low, medium and 
high SSDs).  The Prevention Rate (the mean probability of responding before the Change signal could 
appear, when a Change trial was scheduled), was 0.23, ranging from 0.18 to 0.30 across pigeons.  As 
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would be expected, this probability increased with SSD (means of 0.04, 0.23 and 0.44 for low, 
medium and high SSDs). It also varied across blocks, but not monotonically (highest value 0.30, in 
Block 2, lowest 0.17, in Block 4).  
The mean Go latency, the time taken to move on when the tracking spot had not changed its 
trajectory (and was not scheduled to change it), was 2.20s (range across the five pigeons 1.21s to 
3.13s).  It reduced slightly across the four session blocks, from a mean of 2.43s in Block 1 (range 
across the five pigeons: 1.36s to 3.46s) to a mean of 2.12s in Block 4 (range 1.03s to 3.44s).  It 
showed little variation with the SSD in use in Probe trials of the same session (means of 2.17s, 2.24s 
and 2.21s for low medium and high SSDs); this is to be expected since the Go latencies are drawn 
only from non-Probe trials.  
The overall mean Error latency, the time taken to move to the tracking spot when it had changed 
color, was 1.96s (range across pigeons 0.80s to 3.64s).  This latency reduced more substantially 
across the session blocks, from a mean of 2.97s in Block 1 (range 0.85s to 9.04s) to 1.37s in Block 4 
(range 0.70s to 2.73s).  Averaged across blocks, it was substantially shorter at low SSDs (mean 1.33s) 
than at medium or high SSDs (means of 2.37s and 2.33s respectively); however, this average effect 
was largely due to Blocks 1 and 2, and by Block 4 there was little variation in Error latency SSD (see 
further analysis below). 
The overall mean Start-Correct latency was 3.39s (range across pigeons 1.99s to 7.18s).  It 
reduced considerably across blocks, from a mean of 4.45 (range 2.43s to 12.40s) in Block 1 to a mean 
of 2.88s (range 1.52s to 5.77s in Block 4).  On average, It was somewhat shorter at the low SSD level 
(mean 3.11s) than at medium or high SSD (means 3.66s and 3.56s respectively), and this trend was 
consistent across blocks. 
The overall mean Change-Correct latency was 2.66s (range across pigeons 1.38s to 6.32s).  It 
reduced across session blocks, from a mean of 3.58s in Block 1 (range 1.60s to 11.53s) to a mean of 
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2.28s in Block 4 (range 1.16s to 5.03s).  Latencies were somewhat longer for the low and medium 
SSD levels (means of 2.71s and 2.85s respectively) than for the high SSD level (mean of 2.34s).  This 
effect was most marked in Block 1; in Block 4 the trend was non-monotonic (see further analysis 
below).  
There was no noticeable trend in any of the above values across Block 4, and little difference in 
them between Blocks 3 and 4.  Block 4 performance was therefore judged to be asymptotic, so that 
the data from this block were suitable for hypothesis testing. 
Hypothesis testing on data from Session Block 4 
Within Block 4, the Total Error Rate varied unsystematically between SSDs, mean values being 
0.12, 0.16 and 0.10 for the Short, Medium and Long SSD levels respectively.  Neither the differences 
between these, nor the effect of session number, was significant in the GEE (QIC = 174.94). There 
was a significant interaction between SSD level and session number (χ22 = 5.99, p < 0.05), with the 
rate increasing across sessions by an estimated 15.6% per session at the Medium SSD level and 
decreasing at the Short and Long levels by an estimated 10.7% and 1.9% per session, though all the 
variation was erratic in all cases. 
The Actual Error Rate varied somewhat more between SSDs, mean values being 0.12, 0.21 and 
0.15 for the Short, Medium and Long SSD levels respectively.  The differences between these were 
significant (χ22 = 17.87, p < 0.001) in the GEE (QIC = 162.65).  The effect of session number, and the 
interaction between SSD level and session number were also significant (session number effect, χ21 = 
4.04, p < 0.05; interaction χ22 = 19.49, p < 0.001).  The variation of Actual Error Rate with session 
number was erratic at all SSD levels, but there was a slight decreasing trend overall, which was 
greatest (estimated value 10.7% per session) at the Low SSD level and reversed at the Medium level 
(estimated increase 9.8% per session). 
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The Prevention Rate varied sharply between SSD levels, with means of 0.01, 0.19 and 0.33 at the 
Short, Medium and Long SSD levels.  The differences between these were significant (χ22 = 999.01, p 
< 0.001) in the GEE (QIC = 103.19).  There was a significant, albeit again erratic, tendency for the rate 
to increase across sessions (χ21 = 31.63, p < 0.001), but this was entirely due to a trend at the Long 
SSD level (estimated increase of 12.6% per session), and the interaction between SSD and session 
number was correspondingly significant (χ22 = 2550.45, p < 0.001)  
Figures 2 and 3 show the latency data from Block 4 relevant to the hypotheses derived from the 
independent horse-race model.  Figure 2 shows, for each pigeon, the mean latencies of Go and Error 
responses (recall that only Actual Error responses contribute to the mean Error latency).  The figure 
shows that for four out of the five pigeons, the mean Error latency was substantially shorter than the 
mean Go latency, as predicted by the independent horse-race model; for the remaining pigeon, 
there was a smaller difference in the opposite direction.  In Figure 3, panel (a) shows, for each 
pigeon, the mean Start-Correct latency at the three SSD levels, and panel (b) shows the 
corresponding Change-Correct latencies.  Panel (a) shows that there was some trend, albeit weak 
and inconsistent, for the Start-Correct latency to increase as a function of the SSD.  Panel (b) shows 
that this trend was reduced in all five pigeons, and largely eliminated in the mean, when Change-
Correct latencies were considered, consistent with the findings of Logan and Burkell (1986). 
Figures 2 & 3 about here 
GEE analysis confirmed that the trend shown in Figure 2 was statistically significant.  In the 
analysis of the Go and Error latencies (QIC = 101.97), latency type had a significant main effect (χ21 = 
6.18, p = .013, POV=2.84%).  Session number also had a significant effect (χ21 = 4.02, p = 045, 
POV=0.23%), and so did its interaction with latency type (χ21 = 4.36, p = .037, POV=2.15%).  The 
variation in latencies across session numbers was erratic, but overall there was a slight tendency 
towards increasing latencies (by 0.2% per session for the Go latencies, and 10.1% per session for the 
Error latencies).  The interaction was due to a small decrease in the difference between the latency 
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type across sessions.  In the analyses of Change latencies, no significant effects were found, either in 
the Start-Correct (QIC = 102.99; POVs for SSD, Session number and their interaction 2.36%, 0.10% 
and 0.90% respectively) or Change-Correct latencies (QIC = 127.02, POVs for SSD, Session number 
and their interaction 1.52%, 0.11% and 0.92% respectively).    
Discussion 
The tracking procedure proved to be an effective context for testing predictions of the 
independent horse-race model.  The pigeons tracked the moving spot efficiently, and made 
sufficient errors when the spot changed its trajectory for stable estimates of error latencies to be 
obtained.  However, like the operant procedure used by Meier et al. (2018), it required substantial 
training of the pigeons before the change signal procedure could be introduced, and in this respect it 
compares unfavorably with the arena methods used by Knolle et al. (2017) and Meier et al. (2017).  
The source of this difference is obvious.  All stop or change signal procedures require a response that 
is prepotent; arena methods use the unconditional approach to food, whereas in the present 
experiment, as in that of Meier et al. (2018), we had to train a novel response up to a high level in 
order to make it prepotent.  The corresponding advantage of our procedure is that the prepotent 
response is well-defined and uniform, in contrast with the relatively uncontrolled response of 
approaching food; and the tracking task has an intuitive appeal as ecologically relevant to many 
species while being easy to observe and record. 
The results of our tests of the independent horse-race model are unambiguous, and consistent 
with previous literature.  The first prediction, that the probability of incorrectly pecking the 
Changed-color stimulus would increase as SSD increased, appears not to have been confirmed: 
differences in Total Error Rate with SSD were non-significant, and the trend was non-systematic.  
However, in experiments with human participants, fast responses when a Change or Stop is 
scheduled are generally included in the error response distribution (e.g. Logan & Cowan, 1984; 
Verbruggen et al. 2019).  We treated them as correct since the pigeons could not know that a 
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change was due to occur, and we feared disruption of performance if we interfered with the 
contingencies of reinforcement by counting such responses as errors.  From the data reported, we 
can see what the pattern would be if Preventions were included in the Error distribution: under that 
definition, the mean error rate would be the sum of the Total Error Rate and Prevention Rate 
reported above.  The mean values of this sum in Block 4 were 0.13, 0.35 and 0.48 for Short, Medium 
and Long SSD values, as predicted by the model and as typically found in human participants.   
The second prediction, that Error responses would be made significantly faster, on average, than 
Go responses, was also confirmed.  Our test of this hypothesis was conservative, because of our 
procedure of cancelling the scheduled stimulus change and treating the response as correct, if a 
Prevention response was made.  If we had treated these responses as errors, the mean Error 
latencies would necessarily have been reduced (since Prevention responses necessarily had short 
latencies), and their difference from the Go response latencies would have been enhanced. 
The third prediction, that the Change-Correct latency should be independent of SSD, was also 
supported. This is consistent with the findings of Logan and Burkell (1986). However, our test of this 
hypothesis was weak, since the tendency for Start-Correct latencies to increase with SSD was weak, 
and inconsistent across pigeons.  In any case, we cannot lay too much emphasis on this result, since 
it depends on a null result, and furthermore one that comes from a small sample showing quite 
variable behavior. 
The results support the conclusions of Meier et al. (2018), who showed that the horse-race model 
could predict the performance of pigeons in an operant-conditioning simulation of a stop or change 
signal task.  Our present task was markedly different from that used by Meier et al., involving more 
variation in the location of the changing stimulus, and requiring the pigeon to move its head, and 
indeed its body, as it responded to successive Go stimuli, rather than pecking in a constant position.  
These differences made our task a little more like the arena tasks used by Knolle et al. (2017) and 
Meier et al. (2017).  We conclude that, on a continuum of stop or change signal tasks, animals of a 
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variety of species show behavior that is consistent with the independent horse-race model.  Such 
behavior is correspondingly inconsistent with a cognitive decision model of response determination, 
which as noted in our Introduction and pointed out by Smith et al. (2018), would predict longer 
response times on probe than non-probe trials, because of the processing cost of making a choice 
between two options. 
Two wider implications of these results follow from this conclusion.  First, our results add to a 
growing body of evidence, from Stop- and Change-Signal paradigms but also other types of 
experiment, and across a range of species, that many tasks in which animals have two response 
options may not be best described in the language of “choice”.  Whether we are considering 
simulated foraging behavior (e.g. Kacelnik et al., 2011; Shapiro et al., 2008), mid-session reversal 
(e.g. Smith et al., 2018), or Stop- and Change-Signal paradigms (e.g. Feola et al., 2000; Knolle et al., 
2017; Meier et al., 2018, and the present experiment), performance can be accurately described by 
assuming that each stimulus starts an independent process, and the eventual response depends only 
on which of those processes completes first.  There is no need to invoke any process of cognitive 
comparison or weighing up of alternatives, of the kind that gives rise to the Hick-Hyman law in 
choice-reaction time experiments.  In our situation, and many others, it seems that, to quote 
Herrnstein (1970, p. 255), “choice is nothing but behavior set into the context of other behavior”.  
Many of the previous papers cited here support this conclusion for essentially the same reasons as 
our present results, but the implication has not always been fully brought out.  Furthermore, in 
some of the previous experiments (e.g. Meier et al., 2018), Prevention responses were not excluded 
from the Error distribution, so although we know that the data are consistent with the independent 
horsehorse-race model, we cannot be sure that they were inconsistent with a choice-reaction 
model. 
Second, neither successful performance in a Stop- or Change-signal task, nor performance that is 
quantitatively consistent with the independent horse-race model, should be taken as evidence of 
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complex cognitive function.  Although the Stop- and Change-signal tasks have been seen as tests of 
executive function, that overarching construct has proved hard to describe and harder still to tie to 
any particular behavior (Rabbitt, 1997, chap. 1); its explanatory power is therefore open to question.  
Our results add to the evidence that both successful Change-signal performance, and performance 
consistent with the independent horse-race model, can be entirely consistent with behavior being 
governed by associative processes, without reference to executive processes.  Indeed, Verbruggen 
and Logan (2008) and Bowditch, Verbruggen and McLaren (2016), among others, have argued this 
may be the case for humans in the highly trained tasks commonly used in experiments on executive 
control.  This should not be surprising.  Acquired inhibition has been studied within the context of 
associative learning at least since the time of Pavlov (1927); for a recent review, see Sosa and 
Ramirez (2019).  Only with great caution should the capacity for inhibition or stopping, as such, be 
taken as evidence for complex cognitive processes.  
 
References 
Audley, R. J. (1960).  A stochastic model for individual choice behavior.  Psychological Review, 67, 1-
15.  https://doi.org/10.1037/h0046438 
Best, M., Lawrence, N. S., Logan, G. D., McLaren, I. P. L., & Verbruggen, F. (2016).  Should I stop or 
should I go? The role of associations and expectancies. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Human Perception and Performance, 42, 115-137. 
Beuk, J., Beninger, R. J., & Paré, M. (2014).  Investigating a race model account of executive control 
in rats with the countermanding paradigm.  Neuroscience, 263, 96-110. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroscience.2014.01.014 
Bowditch, W. A., Verbruggen, F., & McLaren, I. P. L. (2016).  Associatively mediated stopping: 
Training stimulus-specific inhibitory control.  Learning & Behavior, 44, 162-174. 
https://doi.org/10.3758/s13420-015-0196-8 
 24 
Feola, T. W., de Wit, H., & Richards, J. B. (2000).  Effects of d-amphetamine and alcohol on a measure 
of behavioral inhibition in rats.  Behavioral Neuroscience, 114, 838-848. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0735-7044.114.4.838 
Grissom, R. J., & Kim, J. J. (2012).  Effect sizes for research, 2nd edition. New York: Routledge. 
Hanes, D. P., Patterson, W. F., & Schall, J. D. (1998).  Role of frontal eye fields in countermanding 
saccades: Visual, movement, and fixation activity.  Journal of Neurophysiology, 79, 817-834. 
Harding, J. W., & Hilbe, J. M. (2013).  Generalized estimating equations, 2nd edition. Boca Raton FL: 
CRC Press. 
Herrnstein, R. J. (1970).  On the law of effect.  Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 13, 
243-266. doi:10.1901/jeab.1970.13-243 
Hick, W. E. (1952).  On the rate of gain of information.  Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 
4, 11-26. doi:10.1080/17470215208416600 
Hyman, R. (1953).  Stimulus information as a determinant of reaction time.  Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 45, 188-196. doi:10.1037/h0056940 
Kacelnik, A., Vasconcelos, M., Monteiro, T., & Aw, J. (2011).  Darwin's "tug-of-war" vs. starlings' 
"horse-racing": how adaptations for sequential encounters drive simultaneous choice.  
Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 65, 547-558. doi:10.1007/s00265-010-1101-2 
Knolle, F., McBride, S. D., Stewart, J. E., Goncalves, R. P., & Morton, A. J. (2017).  A stop-signal task 
for sheep: introduction and validation of a direct measure for the stop-signal reaction time.  
Animal Cognition, 20, 615-626. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10071-017-1085-7 
Lea, S. E. G., Poser-Richet, V., & Meier, C. (2015).  Pigeons can learn to make visual category 
discriminations using either low or high spatial frequency information.  Behavioural Processes, 
112, 81-87. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.beproc.2014.11.012 
Lea, S. E. G., Wills, A. J., Leaver, L. A., Ryan, C. M. E., Bryant, C. M. L., & Millar, L. (2009).  A 
comparative analysis of the categorization of multidimensional stimuli: II. Strategic information 
search in humans (Homo sapiens) but not in pigeons (Columba livia).  Journal of Comparative 
 25 
Psychology, 123, 406-420. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0016851 
Logan, G. D., & Burkell, J. (1986). dependence and independence in responding to double 
stimulation - a comparison of stop, change, and dual-task paradigms. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 12(4), 549–563. 
Logan, G. D., & Cowan, W. B. (1984).  On the ability to inhibit thought and action - a theory of an act 
of control.  Psychological Review, 91, 295-327. https://doi.org/10.1037//0033-295X.91.3.295 
Logan, G. D., Van Zandt, T., Verbruggen, F., & Wagenmakers, E.-J. J. (2014). On the ability to inhibit 
thought and action: General and special theories of an act of control. Psychological Review, 121, 
66–95. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0035230 
MacLean, E. L., Hare, B., Nunn, C. L., … and Zhao, Y. (2014).  The evolution of self-control.  
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 111, 
E2140-E2148. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1323533111 
Meier, C., Lea, S. E. G., & McLaren, I. P. L. (2016a).  A stimulus-location effect in contingency-
governed, but not rule-based, discrimination learning.  Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Animal Learning and Cognition, 42, 177-186. https://doi.org/ 10.1037/xan0000098 
Meier, C., Lea, S. E. G., & McLaren, I. P. L. (2016b).  Task-switching in pigeons: Associative learning or 
executive control?  Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Learning and Cognition, 42, 163-
176. https://doi.org/10.1037/xan0000100 
Meier, C., Lea, S. E. G., & McLaren, I. P. L. (2018).  Pigeons in control of their actions: Learning and 
performance in stop-signal and change-signal tasks.  Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal 
Learning and Cognition, 44, 82-94. https://doi.org/10.1037/xan0000155 
Meier, C., Pant, S. R., van Horik, J. O., Laker, P. R., Langley, E. J. G., Whiteside, M. A., Verbruggen, F., 
& Madden, J. R. (2017).  A novel continuous inhibitory-control task: variation in individual 
performance by young pheasants (Phasianus colchicus).  Animal Cognition, 20, 1035-1047. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10071-017-1120-8 
Nakagawa, S., & Schielzeth, H. (2013).  A general and simple method for obtaining R2 from 
 26 
generalized linear mixed-effects models.  Methods in Ecology and Evolution, 4, 133-142. 
doi:10.1111/j.2041-210x.2012.00261.x 
Pavlov, I. P. (1927).  Conditioned reflexes. (Trans. G. V. Anrep). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Rabbitt, P. M. A. (1997).  Methodology of frontal and executive function. Hove, UK: Psychology Press. 
Scangos, K. W., & Stuphorn, V. (2010).  Medial frontal cortex motivates but does not control 
movement initiation in the countermanding task.  Journal of Neuroscience, 30, 1968-1982. 
https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4509-09.2010 
Shallice T., & Burgess, P. (1993).  Supervisory control of action and thought selection.  In A. Baddeley 
& L. Weiskrantz (Eds.), Attention: selection, awareness, and control, pp. 171-187.  Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Shapiro, M. S., Siller, S., & Kacelnik, A. (2008).  Simultaneous and sequential choice as a function of 
reward delay and magnitude: Normative, descriptive and process-based models tested in the 
European Starling (Sturnus vulgaris).  Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior 
Processes, 34, 75-93. https://doi.org/10.1037/0097-7403.34.1.75 
Smith, A. P., Zentall, T. R., & Kacelnik, A. (2018).  Midsession reversal task with pigeons: Parallel 
processing of alternatives explains choices.  Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Learning 
and Cognition, 44, 272-279. doi:10.1037/xan0000180 
Sosa, R., & Ramírez, M. N. (2019).  Conditioned inhibition: Historical critiques and controversies in 
the light of recent advances.  Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Learning and Cognition, 
45, 17-42.  doi:10.1037/xan0000193 
Verbruggen, F., Aron, A. R., Band, G. P., Beste, C., Bissett, P. G., Brockett, A. T., … Boehler, C. N. 
(2019). A consensus guide to capturing the ability to inhibit actions and impulsive behaviors in the 
stop-signal task. ELife, 8, e46323. https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.46323 
Verbruggen, F., Best, M., Bowditch, W. A., Stevens, T., & McLaren, I. P. L. (2014).  The inhibitory 
control reflex.  Neuropsychologia, 65, 263-278. 
Verbruggen, F., & Logan, G. D. (2008a).  Automatic and controlled response inhibition: Associative 
 27 
learning in the go/no-go and stop-signal paradigms.  Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 
137, 649-672. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0013170 
Verbruggen, F., & Logan, G. D. (2008b).  Response inhibition in the stop-signal paradigm.  Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 12, 418-424. 
Verbruggen, F., & Logan, G. D. (2009).  Models of response inhibition in the stop-signal and stop-
change paradigms.  Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 33, 647-661. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2008.08.014 
Vickrey, C., & Neuringer, A. (2000).  Pigeon reaction time, Hick's law, and intelligence.  Psychonomic 
Bulletin & Review, 7, 284-291. doi:10.3758/BF03212983 
Wasserman, E. A., Nagasaka, Y., Castro, L., & Brzykcy, S. J. (2013).  Pigeons learn virtual patterned-
string problems in a computerized touch screen environment.  Animal Cognition, 16, 737-753. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10071-013-0608-0 
Wilkinson, A., & Kirkpatrick, K (2009).  Visually guided capture of a moving stimulus by the pigeon 
(Columba livia).  Animal Cognition, 12, 127-144. 
Wills, A. J., Lea, S. E. G., Leaver, L. A., Osthaus, B., Ryan, C. M. E., Suret, M., Bryant, C. M. L., 
Chapman, S. J. A., & Millar, L (2009).  A comparative analysis of the categorization of 
multidimensional stimuli: I. Unidimensional classification does not necessarily imply analytic 
processing; evidence from pigeons (Columba livia), squirrels (Sciurus carolinensis) and humans 
(Homo sapiens).  Journal of Comparative Psychology, 123, 391-405. 
 28 
Table 1 
Procedural details for each pigeon 
Pigeon 
Tracking stimulus 
colour 
Training sessions 
before probes began 
Blocks 
completed 
Median Go latency from start of 
Probe Block 1, used to 
determine SSDs in Blocks 1-3 
(ms) 
Median Go latency from preceding 
training sessions, used to determine SSDs 
in Block 4 (ms) 
Minimum Maximum 
Almond green 36 1-4 1369 1345 2104 
Apple red 25 1-4 1535 1055 1530 
Boo red 25 1-4 1274 974 1362 
Congo green 23 1-4 1816 1312 1948 
Egypt green 64 1-2 1166   
Kar red 25 1-2 2007   
Luna green 54 1-3 1731   
Pidge red 25 1-4 872 694 902 
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Figure 1: Partial sequence of events within a probe trial.  Note that the pecks to the Changed-colour 
stimulus had no scheduled consequences, and that pecks to the Go stimulus before the Stop Signal 
Delay had elapsed cancelled the probe.  Not to scale. 
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Figure 2: Mean latencies of Go responses (RTg) and Error responses (RTe) in Test Block 4.  
Error bars show ranges of these means over the 10 sessions of the block. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
Figure 3: Mean latencies of Change responses as a function of Stop Signal Delay (SSD), in Test Block 
4. (a) Start-Correct latencies (timed from the appearance of the Go stimulus in its unchanged 
position) and (b) Change-Correct latencies (timed from appearance of the Changed-colour stimulus).  
Error bars show ranges of these means over the 10 sessions of the block. 
